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Abstract
The debate over the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) in late 2018 showcases the crucial role
of digital and, in particular, social media as vehicles of disinformation that populist actors can exploit in an effort to create
resentment and fear in the public sphere. While mainstream political actors and legacy media initially did not address the
issue, right‐wing populist actors claimed ownership by framing (presumably obligatory) mass immigration as a matter of
social, cultural, economic, and not least political risk, and created an image of political and cultural elites conspiring to
keep the issue out of the public sphere. Initially advanced via digital and social media, such frames resonated sufficiently
strongly in civil society to politicize the GCM in various national public spheres. In this article, these dynamics are explored
by comparing the politicization of the GCM in three EU member states, namely Germany, Austria, and Sweden. Using a
process‐tracing design, the article (a) identifies the key actors in the process, (b) analyzes how the issue emerged in social
and other digital media and travelled from digital media into mainstreammass media discourse, and finally (c) draws com‐
parative conclusions from the three analyzed cases. Particular emphasis is placed on the frames used by right‐wing populist
actors, how these frames resonated in the wider public sphere and thereby generated communicative power against the
GCM, ultimately forcing the issue onto the agenda of national public spheres and political institutions.
Keywords
communicative power; digital media; frame analysis; Global Compact for Migration; populism; public sphere
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Reactionary Politics and Resentful Affect in Populist Times” edited by Tereza Capelos
(University of Birmingham, UK), Stavroula Chrona (King’s College London, UK), Mikko Salmela (University of Helsinki,
Finland / University of Copenhagen, Denmark), and Cristiano Bee (Oxford Brookes University, UK).
© 2021 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu‐
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
The debate over the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly
and Regular Migration (GCM) in late 2018 showcases
the crucial role of social and other digital media as vehi‐
cles of disinformation that populist actors can exploit in
order to politicize issues by creating resentment and fear
in the public sphere. Adopted at an intergovernmental
conference in Marrakesh in December 2018, the GCM
provides an assessment of the political issues brought
about by international migration and formulates legally
non‐binding recommendations for dealing with them
(cf. Newland, 2019; Pécoud, 2020). While most of the
23 objectives can be categorized as either uncontro‐
versial (e.g., improving migration data) or merely aspi‐
rational (e.g., reducing negative drivers of migration),
others were ultimately construed as much more con‐
troversial, in particular the aspect of improving oppor‐
tunities for legal migration (see Newland, 2019, for a
more detailed overview). Although the GCM initially did
not attract much attention in EU public spheres, a num‐
ber of EU member states soon began to withdraw their
approval of the compact. The aim of this article is to
analyze what caused this change of position and, in
particular, what role mobilization and politicization pro‐
cesses facilitated by social media infrastructures played
in these processes.
Theoretically, the case of the GCM is relevant from
a number of perspectives. Against the backdrop of the
theme of this thematic issue, the case draws attention
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to the ways in which the far right mobilized opposition
against the GCM through the use of specific frames (see
also Godwin & Trischler, 2021) and resentful affect (see
also Salmela & Capelos, 2021), ultimately forcing the
issue onto the agenda of the wider public sphere and
the political system. Against the backdrop of discussions
on post‐truth politics, the case furthermore highlights
(a) the role that inadvertent misinformation as well as
deliberate disinformation can play in mobilization pro‐
cesses in the public sphere, and (b) what impact this
may have on institutional decision making. In addition,
the case also offers methodologically relevant insights
into the operationalization of how communicative power
is generated in the public sphere: Drawing on earlier
work, communicative power generation is seen to be
initiated through framing processes and depends on
the extent to which frames advanced, e.g., via social
media resonate in the public sphere at large (Conrad
& Oleart, 2020). Finally, the case highlights that such
mis‐/disinformation and mobilization processes would
be inconceivable in the absence of social and other digi‐
tal media infrastructures.
The empirical analysis highlights the causal pathways
through which opposition against the GCM moved from
the fringes of the political spectrum via social/digital
media into the wider public sphere and ultimately into
the institutions of the political system. This process
is analyzed through a comparative case study with a
process‐tracing design (Beach & Brun Pedersen, 2013).
The study analyzes three cases of countries where the
debate on the GCM, though ultimately short‐lived, was
particularly contentious: Germany, Austria, and Sweden.
These are illustrative cases, chosen primarily for the pur‐
pose of demonstrating how far‐right actors have used
social and other digital media to cause outrage about
the GCM, what impact this has had on broader public
debate and what responses it ultimately elicited from
institutional actors within the political system.
Following this short introduction, the next section
presents the article’s theoretical argument on post‐truth
politics, digitalmedia and right‐wingmobilization against
the GCM. Section 3 presents the analytical framework,
while Section 4 presents the empirical analysis. The arti‐
cle ends with a concluding discussion in Section 5.
2. Post‐Truth Politics, Digital Media, and Right‐Wing
Mobilization Against the GCM
The short‐lived politicization of the GCM is not merely a
textbook example of the impact of social media in con‐
texts characterized by politicization, polarization and dis‐
information (cf. Tucker et al., 2018). The causal impact
of mis‐/disinformation about the GCM also makes it
an illustrative case for the broader phenomenon of
post‐truth politics.
Despite the growing popularity of the concept (e.g.,
Farkas& Schou, 2020;MacMullen, 2020;McIntyre, 2018;
Newman, 2019), theoretical debates on post‐truth pol‐
itics clearly underline how difficult the concept is to
define, both in terms of its originality/novelty and the
severity of the challenge that it presents to liberal democ‐
racies. In the Oxford English Dictionary, where post‐truth
was chosen as the word of the year in 2016, the concept
was defined as “relating to or denoting circumstances
in which objective facts are less influential in shaping
public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal
belief” (Post‐truth, n.d.). This definition rhymeswell with
the communicative processes surrounding the adoption
of the GCM. The theoretical point of departure in this
article connects post‐truth politics to a profound trans‐
formation in political culture, characterized by a loss of
the “symbolic authority of truth” in the public sphere
(Newman, 2019). According to this view, the extent to
which factually correct information matters in political
debate appears to be fading. In fact, post‐truth politics
is characterized by the idea that facts themselves are
becoming contentious, thereby undermining the distinc‐
tion between facts and opinions that Hannah Arendt saw
as an indispensable precondition for political dispute:
There cannot be any meaningful discussion on political
issues in the absence of a commonly accepted factual
basis (Newman, 2019). Furthermore, post‐truth politics
is characterized by an undermining of what Habermas—
in his Theory of Communicative Action—still held to be
something that could be taken for granted, namely the
“implicit validity claims” raised in interpersonal commu‐
nication (Habermas, 1981): The idea that we can trust
that the person we are talking to actually means what
they say and believe it to be true, at least to the best of
their knowledge.
Beyond this speaker dimension, MacMullen (2020)
has furthermore drawn attention to what we may call
the audience dimension of post‐truth politics: Post‐truth
politics is also characterized by audiences who are seem‐
ingly indifferent about the factual veracity of the informa‐
tion they are exposed to. People with this kind of “moti‐
vationally postfactual” attitudes could know with ease
whether or not information given to them is correct but
accept the information regardless because it confirms
their previously held beliefs, gives them a good feeling
and/or a sense of community (MacMullen, 2020). Given
the extent to which the politicization of the GCM was
premised on disinformation (as the analysis will demon‐
strate), this is an important point of departure.
In this context, social media are viewed by most
scholars to play an important role (Bennett & Pfetsch,
2018; Farkas & Schou, 2020; McIntyre, 2018; Sunstein,
2017), all the more so as it has been demonstrated
that false news stories travel much faster online than
true ones (Vosoughi et al., 2018). The analysis presented
in this article addresses this connection between social
(and other digital) media and post‐truth politics: Social
media are not simply used in an effort tomobilize against
and politicize a particular issue, but rather provide an
infrastructure that allows for the inadvertent spread of
misinformation as well as for the deliberate spread of
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disinformation about the issue at stake. In this context, it
has to be pointed out that although mis‐/disinformation
are at times used interchangeably, misinformation may
be unintentional, whereas disinformation essentially
refers to “misinformation that is deliberately propa‐
gated” (Guess & Lyons, 2020, p. 11; see also Tucker
et al., 2018). Theoretical arguments about post‐truth
politics, in combination with observations about the
role of social and other digital media in such contexts,
clearly call for more empirical research on processes in
which mis‐/disinformation has had politically relevant
outcomes. Debates on the GCM are well‐suited for this
kind of analysis: Although they were ultimately relatively
short‐lived and arguably had limited immediate politi‐
cal impact beyond the sudden politicization of the GCM,
they were indicative of the kind of polarization and “dis‐
rupted public spheres” (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018) that
have increasingly come to characterize liberal democra‐
cies in the wake of the rise of digital and social media
(Barberá, 2020; Persily & Tucker, 2020; Sunstein, 2017).
3. Methodological Aspects
The article proposes a causal mechanism that explains
the short‐lived politicization of the GCM between the
time of the agreement on the draft text in July 2018
and the adoption of the GCM in December 2018. During
this period, a number of states (including one which
is analyzed here, namely Austria) withdrew from the
compact, which raises questions about the reasons why
some countries changed course on a matter that they
had just agreed on. The causal mechanism consists of
four parts, which can be summarized as (a) initial news
reporting; (b) silence in the public sphere and mobiliza‐
tion in the digital sphere; (c) contestation by institutional
actors; and (d) contestation of and support for the GCM
in mainstream media (see Figure 1). First, news on the
agreement on the draft text of the GCM in July 2018
was reported in legacy media in the analyzed countries.
Legacy media are here taken to include traditional mass
media such as daily newspapers and/or public broadcast‐
ers, but also their respective online versions (cf. Davis,
2019). At this point, the GCMwas framed predominantly
as a problem‐solving instrument and was neither made
the object of opinion‐making journalism nor sparked any
immediate debate in other (visible) forums of the pub‐
lic sphere. Second, civil‐society actors at the domestic
level—both organized and unorganized—started mobi‐
lizing against the compact, triggered either by news
reporting on the GCM draft text or by events such as
the announcement of Hungary’s withdrawal from the
compact. This mobilization took place to a large extent
(thoughnot exclusively) via social andother digitalmedia.
As the analysis will show, blogs played an important
role in this process, although their resonance clearly
depended on amplification achieved through sharing via
socialmedia. Increasingly, theGCMwas then also framed
as a matter of risk. Third, mobilization against the GCM
on social media began to resonate in the broader public
sphere, in particular as representatives of political par‐
ties began to address and criticize aspects that had pre‐
viously seemed uncontroversial. The line between these
two parts of the causal mechanism may be somewhat
blurry, since some right‐wing populist politicians also
used social media to participate in the initial mobiliza‐
tion against the GCM. The third part of the causal mech‐
anism is however characterized by the increasing contes‐
tation of the GCMalso by other andmoremoderate insti‐
tutional actors. At this stage, these actors found them‐
selves compelled to respond to the apparently intensi‐
fying public opposition to the compact, not least with
regard to claims that parliaments and/or the general
public had been kept in the dark about an issue con‐
strued as highly sensitive. This led to the fourth step of
the causal mechanism: As institutional actors began to
address presumably controversial aspects of the GCM,
the issue was increasingly also taken up by legacy media,
which in turn had an impact on the way the GCM was
framed; while some legacy media reported on disinfor‐
mation campaigns and attempted to clarify the actual
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Figure 1. Basic structure of the causal mechanism.
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form, content and ambitions of the compact, others
adopted the frames advanced via socialmedia and either
criticized the previous lack of debate on the GCM or pre‐
sented the compact as a matter of risk and/or threat.
The dynamics of the politicization of the GCM vary
across the analyzed states, but the analysis reveals that
a broader causalmechanismwas at play across countries.
In an effort to refine the causal mechanism in light of
empirical findings from the three countries, the analysis
(a) develops a timeline of the politicization of the GCM;
(b) identifies the most relevant actors in this process;
(c) analyzes the frames used by these actors in making
sense of the GCM and its consequences, in particular as
regards differences in the frames used by actors on digi‐
tal/social as opposed to legacy media; and (d) discusses
the importance of social media infrastructures as a pre‐
requisite for politicizing the GCM and thereby forcing it
(back) onto the agenda of the political system.
The analysis is based both on legacy media material
(both quality and tabloid newspapers) and social and dig‐
ital media material. The content analysis of legacy media
material is based on a total of 322 articles published
between July and December 2018. All articles were col‐
lected via the websites of the respective newspapers
(see Table 1 for an overview). The German sample con‐
sists of articles from the conservative daily Die Welt,
the liberal daily Süddeutsche Zeitung, the left‐alternative
daily die tageszeitung, the daily tabloid Bild, and the lib‐
eral weekly Die Zeit. The Austrian sample consists of arti‐
cles from the left‐liberal daily Der Standard, the liberal
daily Die Presse, the conservative weekly Wochenblick,
and the daily tabloid Kronen‐Zeitung. The Swedish sam‐
ple consists of articles from the liberal daily Dagens
Nyheter, the conservative daily Svenska Dagbladet, the
liberal tabloid Expressen, and the social democratic
tabloid Aftonbladet. In order to trace the development
of the respective publications’ coverage of the GCM, the
publication date and the type of articlewere coded for all
322 articles. Thiswas done in order to ascertainwhen the
debate started in the analyzed countries, what triggered
it and whether the debate on social media preceded or
merely accompanied the debate in mainstream media
and the wider public sphere. But the types of articles
published also reflect the increasing politicization of the
issue: While early coverage of the GCM took place pre‐
dominantly in the form of news reporting, the frequency
of opinion articles increased as the debate intensified.
Especially towards the end of the analyzed period, the
sampled newspapers published an increasing number
of editorials, signed commentaries and op‐ed articles.
However, the newspaper sample also included a consid‐
erable share of analytical background articles that were
neither purely news nor opinion articles. In order to sim‐
plify the analysis, articleswere coded as belonging to one
of three categories, i.e., (a) news, (b) background and/or
analysis, or (c) opinion articles. Opinion articles included
editorials, signed commentaries, op‐eds and also inter‐
views, in which invited speakers are given the opportu‐
nity to express and explain their views about an issue
at hand.
For the frame analysis, on the other hand, a sample
of 60 articles (20 per country) was selected. For each
country, five articles were sampled for the month of July,
ten for October and November, and five for December.
Priority was given to the articles that most adequately
reflected the diversity of views in the broader debate on
the GCM, that is: Whenever possible, articles that are
supportive as well as articles that are critical of the GCM
(or aspects thereof) were selected. Preference was fur‐
thermore given to opinion pieces. This was done in an
effort to capture the increasing contentiousness of the
debate on the GCM, which is seen as an indicator of
the compact’s increasing politicization. Nevertheless, the
sample also reflects the predominance of news reporting
and analytical articles, in particular in the month of July.
In the frame analysis, frames were identified induc‐
tively and refined in successive rounds of coding.
The frame analysis includes all diagnostic and prognostic
Table 1.Mainstream media coverage of the GCM (percentages in parentheses).
Country Type of article July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Total
AUT News 4 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0) 5 (25) 43 (49) 17 (57) 69 (48)
AUT Background/Analysis 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (100) 9 (45) 28 (32) 8 (27) 47 (33)
AUT Opinion 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 6 (30) 17 (19) 5 (17) 28 (19)
AUT Total 4 0 2 20 88 30 144
GER News 2 (40) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (40) 25 (28) 14 (35) 43 (32)
GER Background/Analysis 3 (60) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (60) 44 (50) 20 (50) 70 (52)
GER Opinion 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 15 (17) 6 (15) 21 (16)
GER Total 5 0 0 5 88 40 134
SWE News 4 (80) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (50) 4 (44) 13 (46) 22 (50)
SWE Background/Analysis 1 (20) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (50) 2 (22) 9 (32) 13 (30)
SWE Opinion 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (33) 6 (21) 9 (20)
SWE Total 5 0 0 2 9 28 44
Total 14 0 2 27 181 98 322
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frames, i.e., frames that either identify and define
problems connected to the GCM or propose solutions
to these perceived problems, respectively (cf. Benford
& Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988). In particular,
the frame analysis considers the impact of what is
referred to, in this thematic issue, as “resentful affect”
(cf. Capelos & Demertzis, 2018; Capelos & Katsanidou,
2018), arguing that the politicization of the GCM was
premised on the deliberate use of a highly specific set of
frames. In this regard, emphasis is placed on the aspect
of timing, i.e., the question to what extent the initial
silence in the public sphere gave right‐wing actors an
opportunity to set the tone in the debate through the use
of resentful affect and disinformation on social media.
Most of the frames identified in the analysis belong to
the categories of risk, opportunity or process frames, i.e.,
frames that construed the GCM as a matter of risk (see
also Godwin & Trischler, 2021) as an opportunity, or that
addressed issues concerning the process of drafting and
negotiating the compact. A full list of all identified frames
is available in Supplementary File 1.
The socialmedia analysis, on the other hand, is based
on material collected on Twitter between 1 July and
31 December 2018. To begin with, the analysis identi‐
fied (a) the most important hashtags around which the
debate crystallized and (b) the most impactful users in
the sampled period. The most important hashtags were
identified by performing a keyword search based on the
most commonly used Swedish and German words for
the GCM (i.e., “migrationsavtal” and “Migrationspakt,”
respectively). Combining this keyword search with pre‐
defined minimum levels of engagement (i.e., “likes” and
“retweets”) made it possible to identify the most salient
hashtags in the analyzed period. In a second step, these
keywords and hashtags were then used to identify the
most impactful users. Impact was also defined in terms
of engagement: The most impactful users were consid‐
ered to be those whose tweets generated the highest
numbers of likes and retweets. This dual sampling strat‐
egy made it possible to focus the social media ana‐
lysis both on the role of impactful individuals and at
the same time also to analyze other content published
under the same hashtags. Since a number of tweets
also included links to other content by these individuals
(notably blogs), these were also included in the analysis.
4. The Unexpected Politicization of the GCM in Austria,
Germany, and Sweden
The story of the GCM can be read as the story of an unex‐
pected politicization. Politicization is usually understood
as a process of “making previously unpolitical matters
political,” or “moving something into the realm of pub‐
lic choice” (Zürn, 2019, pp. 977–978). This understand‐
ing certainly applies in the context of the GCM. After
all, all 192 UN member states apart from the United
States agreed to the text of the compact on 14 July
2018. Numerous observers have furthermore pointed
out that the compact is not a legally binding interna‐
tional treaty (e.g., Guild et al., 2019; Newland, 2019),
but merely identifies non‐binding policy recommenda‐
tions as to how governments should address interna‐
tional migration (Pécoud, 2020). Presumably, this is also
why the GCM did not attract more attention in the pub‐
lic sphere sooner. Nevertheless, Hungary announced its
withdrawal from the compact already four days after
the agreement on the draft text, thereby kick‐starting
the unexpected and short‐lived politicization of the GCM,
in the wake of which Austria (31 October), Bulgaria
(12 November), the Czech Republic (14 November), and
Poland (20 November) also withdrew from the compact.
Austria’s opt‐out from the GCM is perhaps not sur‐
prising, given that the country has a right‐wing pop‐
ulist party in government. Still, the decision to change
course just three and a half months after agreeing
to the draft text constitutes a puzzle, in particular as
Austria had held the Council Presidency of the European
Union at the time. Sweden and Germany, by contrast,
merely have significant right‐wing populist parties in par‐
liament, namely the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and
the Sweden Democrats (SD), respectively. Both countries
witnessed contentious debates on the GCM in October
and November, but nonetheless did adopt the compact
at the Marrakesh conference. In the German case, the
AfD played a key role in mobilizing against the GCM in
Germany, whereas in the Swedish case, the SD’s role
is somewhat more ambiguous: The party was late to
address the issue and focused predominantly on its criti‐
cism of the Swedish government for not having informed
the public and addressed the issue in the Riksdag—an
approach that mirrors the one adopted by forces on the
rightwing of AngelaMerkel’s Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) in Germany. Parliamentary debates on the GCM
only took place in Germany and Austria. In Germany, the
parliamentary debate preceded the decision in favor of
the GCM on November 29, 2018. In the Austrian case,
a debate was held on 21 November 2018, three weeks
after the government’s announcement of the country’s
withdrawal from the GCM. In Sweden, the GCM was
merely addressed in a hearing in the Riksdag’s Foreign
Affairs Committee on 29 November 2018.
4.1. Initial News Reporting, Silence in Legacy Media, and
Mobilization in the Digital Sphere
News about the agreement reached in July 2018 was
reported in mainstream media in all three of the ana‐
lyzed states but neither sparked any debate in the
wider public sphere nor was not made the object of
opinion‐making journalism in legacymedia. As illustrated
by Figure 2, newspaper coverage of the GCM was in
fact fairly slow to pick up. Apart from news coverage
of the agreement in July, the months of August and
September were characterized by more or less com‐
plete silence. As a notable exception, a debate began
to intensify in September in the Austrian newspaper
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Figure 2. Newspaper coverage of the GCM by country (numbers of articles).
Wochenblick (which has a close affinity to the right‐wing
populist FPÖ). The development of newspaper coverage
in Germany mirrors its Austrian counterpart and peaked
in November, due to the fact that the Austrian with‐
drawal on the last day of October also sparked debate in
Germany, in particular among the right wing of the CDU.
By comparison to the Austrian and German debates,
the Swedish debate was even slower to pick up. Here,
newspaper coverage did not reach its peak until late
November and early December, when the GCM was
taken up in the foreign affairs committee of the Riksdag,
accompanied by protests in various Swedish cities.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the three main
categories of frames used in newspaper coverage of
the GCM. In July, the GCM was predominantly framed
as an opportunity, most of all by highlighting it as
a problem‐solving instrument, both in general and as
regards strengthening migrants’ rights. At this point,
risk frames only appeared by reference to statements
made by the Hungarian government upon the country’s
withdrawal from the GCM and were not adopted by
the respective publications. These risk frames presented
migration in general as a threat and expressed concerns
that the GCM may become legally binding with time.
Despite this relative silence on the GCM in the sum‐
mer, mobilization via social and other digital media
notably preceded debate in legacy media in all three
states. Germany witnessed a relatively quick start and
intensification of the debate on Twitter, where the hash‐
tag #MigrationspaktStoppen emerged as early as in
mid‐September. Other important hashtags in the mobi‐
lization process on Twitter included #Migrationspakt,
#StopptDenPakt (Stop the pact) or #Umvolkung (i.e.,
replacement of native populations with immigrants).
These hashtags were frequently used in combination.
A number of the AfD’s MPs started using the hash‐
tag #MigrationspaktStoppen from early to mid‐October,
claiming, e.g., that “project resettlement is on!” (Bystron,
2018). The party ultimately also claimed exclusive credit
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Figure 3. Types of frames used in newspaper coverage of the GCM.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 301–311 306
(Alternative for Germany, 2018). This phase was also
characterized by considerable activity on the part of con‐
servative bloggers (e.g., Roland Tichy, Vera Lengsfeld,
David Berger or Sylvia Pantel, anMP and spokesperson of
the Berliner Kreis within the CDU), whose contributions
were shared (and thereby amplified) via social media.
In thismobilization process inGermany, theGCMwas
predominantly framed as a matter of risk, but process
frames—in particular the types of silence frames that
were later also adopted inmainstreammedia coverage—
were also commonly used (e.g., Pantel, 2018a, 2018b).
In terms of misleading frames, this initial phase was char‐
acterized by ideas of economic, social and/or cultural
risk—essentially the idea that, with the GCM, “all hur‐
dles for migration are supposed to fall” (Tichy, 2018; see
also Godwin & Trischler, 2021), that the “UN wants to
compel states in the West to accept a massive reloca‐
tion of migrants,” and that political elites are fully aware
that the GCM would fundamentally transform European
societies (Lengsfeld, 2018). On Twitter, such risk frames
were expressed in even more drastic terms, suggesting
that the consequence of the GCM would be “a fight
for resources and civil war” (Landkauf, 2018), that the
German population would “flip and become predomi‐
nantly Islamic and African”within two generations, while
democracy would “mutate into Islamic authoritarianism”
(ibikus31, 2018).
In Sweden, the mobilization process began some‐
what later, instigated by reports about a warning of
the Polish government against the GCM (as a threat
to national security and migration laws) that were
shared on Twitter in October, primarily among right‐
wing social media users. Initially, this mobilization crys‐
tallized around generic hashtags such as #svpol and
#migpol. As the debate intensified, however, it increas‐
ingly crystallized around the hashtags #Mynttorget and
#Mynttorgetprotesterna, named after the square in
Stockholm where demonstrations took place from early
December onwards. Two bloggers played a key role in
this mobilization, namely Katerina Janouch and Jenny
Piper. Their contributions were widely shared on social
media and were therefore instrumental in framing the
GCM on social media. The former ultimately also orga‐
nized the demonstrations against the GCM in Stockholm.
Both risk and process frames were central in this early
mobilization against the GCM. Regarding the latter cat‐
egory, silence frames were particularly salient, most
notably the idea that critical debate on the GCM was
being silenced by the political elite in Sweden, which had
allegedly plotted to keep the public in the dark about
the compact and adopt it without the general public
becoming aware of it (e.g., Piper, 2018). Risk frames,
on the other hand, were used to emphasize the com‐
pact’s alleged lack of distinction between legal and illegal
migration, which was taken as tantamount to migrants
receiving the right to settle in any country of desti‐
nation. Consequently, the GCM is construed as imply‐
ing dramatic negative social, economic and/or cultural
consequences. Resentful affect plays an important role
here as well, as some speak of an “assault on Sweden”
(Janouch, 2018a) and present the GCM as opening the
doors to increasing sexual violence (Janouch, 2018b;
Zackrisson, 2018).
As the mobilization against the GCM gained traction
on social media, mainstream media were still notably
silent on the issue, reflecting that the issue was not
up for debate in the Swedish parliament. In fact, the
Swedish government’s apparent silence on the issue
resulted in the subsequent prominence of silence frames
on social media, which later also resonated in main‐
streammedia. In this initial phase, the SD did not pick up
the issue, which an increasing number of Twitter users
expressed bewilderment about. This void was however
quickly filled by smaller (right‐wing) parties and move‐
ments, such as the Alternative for Sweden (AfS) and
the Populists. The former was quick to claim owner‐
ship of the issue by branding itself as “the only Swedish
party to have taken a stance against the UN’s migration
agreement, of course” (Alternative for Sweden, 2018).
As discussed below, it was the increasing resonance of
silence frames that ultimately forced the other parties
to respond, in particular the SD, thus marking the link
between the first and second part of the causal mech‐
anism in the process.
In the Austrian case, finally, mobilization on social
media began sooner than in Sweden and tended at least
in part to coincide with the mobilization process observ‐
able in Germany. For one, the shared language resulted
in the use of shared hashtags. More importantly, the
Identitarian Movement (Identitäre Bewegung), which
was instrumental in the Austrian mobilization process, is
also active in Germany, and content by the Identitarian
Movement’s most prominent proponent Martin Sellner
was frequently shared by German users. In Austria, the
movement’s digital media campaign against the GCM
began as early as September 2018 and was ampli‐
fied by the organization of demonstrations in October
and November. Some media have pointed out that
the movement’s reading of the GCM was also highly
influential in shaping the position of Vice Chancellor
Heinz‐Christian Strache (Baumann, 2018). Soon after the
start of the Identitarian Movement’s campaign, Strache
expressed his opposition to the GCM, stating as early as
10 September that he is “absolutely critical and nega‐
tive” about the GCM, and two weeks later that he would
not support any UN compact in which migration issues
are not decided on by Austria (“UN‐Migrationspakt:
Türkis‐Blau mahnt zu Vorsicht,” 2018). The Identitarian
Movement’s reading of the GCM was also adopted by
other media: first by the newspaperWochenblick (which
has a close affinity to Strache’s FPÖ), later by the FPÖ
blog unzensuriert, and finally by the tabloid newspaper
Kronenzeitung. Given Strache’s statement that signing
the compact would have been a violation of the coalition
agreement with the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), it is
highly plausible to attribute the Austrian government’s
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change of position on the GCM to the junior coalition
partner FPÖ and, in particular, Vice Chancellor Strache.
4.2. Resonance in the Wider Public Sphere: Contestation
by Institutional Actors
While the mobilization process on social media marked
the starting point of the sudden politicization of the GCM
in the German case, the next step in the process begins
when contestation of the compact starts to surface also
among representatives of political parties and/or MPs.
These now find themselves more or less forced to posi‐
tion themselves in relation to increasing concerns about
the GCM.
In Sweden, this refers primarily to the SD, who had
initially not addressed the GCM. But in addition, the
Moderates also began to question the apparent silence
that had surrounded the drafting and negotiation of the
GCM. In particular, the party criticized the lack of an ana‐
lysis of the consequences of the compact, whichwas also
expressed in a subsequent hearing in the Swedish parlia‐
ment’s foreign affairs committee on 29 November and
became a central theme in the ensuing debate in the
wider public sphere. As Figure 2 shows, this also coin‐
cided with a significant increase in mainstream media
coverage, which only reached its peak in Sweden in late
November and early December. This increasing contesta‐
tion over the GCM’s content and the process pursued by
the Swedish government is also reflected in the frames
used in mainstream media coverage of an increasingly
contentious debate. Figure 3 illustrates that whereas
opportunity frames dominated the (albeit limited) news
coverage in July, it was indeed risk frames that domi‐
nated in October and November. In part, this reflects
a shifting emphasis among institutional actors: At this
point, even more moderate actors began to adopt the
types of process frames initially advocated by far‐right
actors via social media, specifically as regards the ques‐
tion why the potential consequences of the GCM had
not been explored, why the issue wasn’t addressed in
the Swedish parliament and why the Swedish govern‐
ment did not do more to “anchor” the GCM in the public
sphere by raising awareness of and building support for
the compact.
In Germany, criticism of the GCM began to surface
in more conservative circles within Angela Merkel’s CDU,
specifically in the Werte Union and the Berliner Kreis.
To some extent, such concerns were expressed also via
socialmedia. For instance, theWerte Union started using
the prominent hashtag #MigrationspaktStoppen from
mid‐October (Werte Union Berlin, 2018), urging that the
GCM should be discussed both at the CDU’s conven‐
tion in early December and in the Bundestag. Similarly,
the MP Alexander Mitsch (also a member of the Werte
Union) used his Twitter account to call for parliamen‐
tary debate and corrections to the GCM, later claiming
credit for the Werte Union for having generated debate
on the GCM in the German public sphere. This increas‐
ing contestation also had a considerable impact both
on the amount of coverage of the GCM in Germany in
November and on the increasing use of risk and process
frames. Questions about a lack of discussion about the
compact gained prominence in this phase, underlining
the impact of social media mobilization on the frames
used by at least a certain segment of institutional actors.
Despite the fact that party‐political actors have claimed
credit for putting the GCM onto the agenda, it is clear
that the impetus came from mobilization processes tak‐
ing place on social media, as underlined by the initial
silence in mainstream media and the apparent lack of
interest on the part of institutional actors (apart from
the AfD).
4.3. Resonance in the Wider Public Sphere: Contestation
of, and Support for, the GCM in Mainstream Media
This leaves the question of when and to what extent the
increasing politicization moved from institutional actors
into the arenas of opinion‐making journalism. This fourth
step of the causal mechanism shows that social media
mobilization not only resulted in institutional actors
(re‐)politicizing the GCM, but also had an impact on the
frames employed on the opinion pages of the respec‐
tive publications.
With the exception of theWochenblick, resonance of
social media frames in Germany and Austria remained
somewhat limited in mainstream media, in particular as
regards the various risk frames that had been advanced
on social media. Instead, the other sampled newspa‐
pers focused on reporting, analyzing, and commenting
on the extent to which the belated politicization of the
GCM was a result of the spread of mis‐/disinformation
on socialmedia (e.g., Vehlewald, 2018). Consequently, as
illustrated by Figure 3, process and opportunity frames
played a more important role at this point than risk
frames, due also to the fact that many of the sam‐
pled publications used the adoption of the GCM on
10 December as an occasion to analyze its opportunities,
but also to comment on deficits in the process. In par‐
ticular, the more progressive publications left no doubt
that governments could and should have gone to greater
lengths to raise awareness of and build support for the
GCM already in the drafting process. The liberal daily
Süddeutsche Zeitung concluded that the German govern‐
ment had simply “failed” in this regard and should learn
its lesson from this “disaster” (Kastner, 2018), i.e., that
the far right had been given an opportunity to spread
disinformation about the GCM. In a similar vein, the lib‐
eral Der Standard argued that although there had cer‐
tainly been enough to discuss, there had evidently been
no interest in opening a debate on an issue as controver‐
sial and potentially divisive as migration (Hoang, 2018).
Notably, however, the end of the process also wit‐
nessed amuchmore ambivalent perspective on theGCM
than could be expected from the initial lack of interest.
In the end, some of the conservative publications came
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out in more or less complete opposition to the GCM
and presented opinions that highlighted the risk frames
advanced in the mobilization process on social media
(e.g., Aust & Büchel, 2018; Schmid, 2018). A similar pro‐
cess could also be observed in Sweden, where a num‐
ber of editorials took issue with the process of dealing
with the GCM at the domestic level and proposed, at the
very least, to postpone the adoption of the compact (e.g.,
Dahlman, 2018; Sonesson, 2018).
5. Conclusions
The analysis has shown that the case of the GCM can be
taken as a textbook example for the unexpected politi‐
cization of an issue more or less purely because of the
ability of right‐wing actors to exploit social media as
an infrastructure for the spread of mis‐/disinformation.
In this article, this process was highlighted through the
use of a comparative case study that traced the devel‐
opment of the GCM’s politicization in three EU member
states. Although the process followed its own dynamics
in the three chosen countries, a similar causal mecha‐
nismwas at play in all three cases. All three countries had
participated in the negotiations and agreed on the draft
text that was finalized in July 2018. Althoughmainstream
media had reported on this achievement, this did not
generate any debate within the political institutions or
the wider public spheres, but ultimately sparked a mobi‐
lization process on social and other digital media. In this
mobilization process, the ability of actors on the far right
both to frame the issue and to exploit these frames was
instrumental in creating a sense of urgency that allowed
the issue to reach the agenda of the wider public sphere
and the political system. The initial silence in the wider
public sphere—which far‐right actors ironically framed
as a strategic move on the part of the political estab‐
lishment to keep the public in the dark about the impli‐
cations of the GCM—was in fact what allowed far‐right
actors and right‐wing populists alike to claim ownership
of the issue in the first place. As the mobilization process
gained traction on social and digital media, accompanied
by increasing protests on the streets, mainstream politi‐
cal actors as well as mainstream media were forced to
position themselves on the issue. At this point, however,
the frames advanced via social and other digital media
had already resonated in the three public spheres.
Given that the empirical basis of this article is limited
to such a small number of states, it is evidently difficult to
draw any generalizing conclusions. Nonetheless, the arti‐
cle’s empirical findings underline that the GCM is a highly
relevant case against the backdrop of broader debates
on the role of social and other digital media in post‐truth
politics, and the implications of these findings have to be
discussed in that context. Future research will need to
address whether similar processes can also be observed
in other cases and in a larger number of states, whether
in the EU or elsewhere. If similar patterns can be shown
on a broader empirical scale, then the mobilization and
politicization processes that could be witnessed in the
run‐up to the adoption of theGCM inDecember 2018 are
certainly highly ambivalent as regards the role of the pub‐
lic sphere in liberal democracy: The processwas based on
the—presumably strategic—use of mis‐/disinformation,
and this mis‐/disinformation appears to have fallen onto
fertile ground in the digital sphere. This provided an
opportunity for right‐wing populist actors to also claim
ownership of the issue by exploiting the frames con‐
structed in the digital sphere even further. From the per‐
spective of deliberative democracy and communicative
power generation, the ability of organized civil society
to identify concerns and amplify them in the public is
traditionally hailed as bearing significant emancipatory
potential. But as the case of the sudden and unexpected
politicization of the GCM via the digital sphere has indi‐
cated, this mechanism can be turned onto its head seem‐
ingly easily by skillful political actors, all the more so in
a political culture that is increasingly characterized by
post‐truth politics.
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